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Environmental perception is'qualitatively different from object perception which has been the traditional 
subject of perceptual psychology. Environmental perception involves "cognitive mapping" which serves to guide 
human as well as animal behavior within the real environment. In recent years, the concept of cognitive mapping 
has been used increasingly in several fields including cognitive psychology, environmental psychology, develop-
mental psyehology, animal psychology, neuropsychology and behavioral geography. In this essay, some repre-
sentative studies of cognitive mapping in adult human subjects and certain methodological prob,lems were briefly 
discussed. Developmental, animal and neuropsychological studies on spatial cognition also reviewed to help to 
understand how individuals acquire and use spatial knowledge about their environments. 
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I. Introduction 
The perception of the environment has been 
neglected in the traditional study of perception, 
which emphasizes the perception of the object (e.g., 
Baird, 1970) . Ittelson (1973) has contrasted en-
viromental perception with object perception in the 
following way. "In the history of experimental 
psychology the overwhelming bulk of perception re-
search has been carried out in the context of object 
preception, rather than environmental perception, 
with the findings of the former providing the basis 
for the latter. Virtually every major school of 
psychology in the past 100 years has investigated its 
perception problems in the context of object percep-
tion; has developed its theory of perception from the 
results of these studies; and has then transferred the 
explanatory system thus derived into the context of 
environmental perception. As a result, the investiga-
tion of perception has lost the essential esthetic uni-
ty withou w~ich any pursuit leads to chaos, rather 
than res lution ( . 3) ." "The distinction between ob-
ject and environment is ctucial. Objects require 
subjects-a truism whether one is concerned with 
the philosophical unity of the subjec~-object duo, 
or is thinking more n ively of the object as a 'thing' 
which becomes a matt r for psychological study only 
when observed by a subject. In contrast, one cannot 
be a subject of an environment; one can only be a 
participant. T very distinction between self and 
nonself breaks d wn ; the environment surrounds, 
enfolds, engulfs, and no thing and no one can be iso-
lated and id n ified as standing outside of, and apart 
from, it (pp. 12-13) ." Furthermore, Ittelson (1973) 
lis ed the following s ven properties of the environ-
ment which the object does not possess. (1) The 
envrionment cannot be observed but explored. (2) 
18 ~: ~~ j~ ~'~+ ,L, ~: ~P"~ ~: ~~5f~ ~~7~~ 
The environment is always multimodal. (3) Not 
only central (i.e., focus of attention) but peripheral 
(i.e., outside the focus of attention) information ab-
out the environment is important. (4) Environmen-
tal information is rich and redundant. (5) Environ-
mental perception always involves action. (6) The 
environment provides symbolic meanings and moti-
vational messages. (7) The environment has an 
ambience or atmosphere which involves social activi-
ties, and esthetic and systemic qualities. 
These vast differences between object per-
ception and environmental perception suggest that 
traditional theories of the former cannot be helpful 
in explaining phen.omena of the latter. The problem 
of environmental perception has recently been stu-
died by investigators of such new disciplines as en-
vironmental psychology (e.g., Proshanski, Ittelson, 
& Rivlin, 1976) and behavioral geography (e.g., 
Gold, 1980) . These areas have been concerned with 
man's interactions with his environment and have 
tried to explain his spatial behavior in terms of his 
perception of that environment. 
The key concept frequently used in these inves-
tigations is the concept of "cognitive mapping" which 
may be defined as "a process composed of a series of 
psychological transformations by which an indi-
vidual acquires, codes, stores, recalls, and decodes 
information about relative locations and attributes of 
phenomena in his everyday environment (Downs & 
Stea, 1973, p. 9) ." As a result of this mapping pro-
cess, the individual forms a cognitive map of his en-
vironment which helps him to orient and navigate in 
that environment efficiently. The usefulness of the 
cognitive mapping notion is not limited to those 
areas described above. The notion has also been 
used in such areas as the developmental psychology 
of spatial cognition, the psycholgy of animal naviga-
tion and spatial learning, and the neuropsychology 
of spatial abilities. This essay also reviews major 
studies on cognitive mapping in these areas. 
II . Cognitive mapping research 
(1) Some properties of the cognitive map 
The term "cognitive map" was coined by Tol-
man (1948) who used it metaphorically to describe 
the efficient behavior of rats in learning various 
spatial maze tasks. He suggested "that in the course 
of learning something like a field map of the en-
vironment gets established in the rat's brain..... and 
it is this entativ  map, indicating routes and paths 
a d e vironmental relationships, which finally deter-
mines what responses, if any, the animal will final,ly 
release (1948, p. 192) ." In other words, the animal 
uses his cognitive map of the environment (maze) 
to locate the goal and to reach there. Two functions 
of the cogni ive m p become clear (see Downs & 
Stea, 1973) . It answers the questions of (1) where 
certain valued things are, and (2) how to get where 
they are from where the individual is. 
In order to perform these functions the cogni-
tive m p should process and store certain types of 
information. First, it should provide information ab-
out spatia  locations of things (objects, events, or 
phenomena) relative to each other and to the indi-
vidual. Th s locati al information should contain 
both direction and distance of a given object with re-
spect to a r ference point. In addition to the loca-
tional information, the cognitive map should provide 
attr butional information which tells what kiuds of 
objects are located in certain places. Attributes are 
either descriptive (e.g., red house) or evaluative (e.g., 
cheap r st urant) . 
Viewed in this way, the cognitive map of an en-
vironment resembles the cartographic map of the 
same environment. However, this is rarely the case. 
For ex mple, cognitive maps are often incomplete in 
the sense that n t all places and their attributes are 
represented in them. Cognitive maps may be dis-
torted in terms of distance and/or direction, such 
that an individual's subjective geometry deviates 
from th  Euclidean vi w of the real world. In terms 
of distanc  distortions, Lee (1970) has indicated 
that, given two urban facilities equidistant froni an 
urban resident, one located on the downtown side is 
c nsidered closer than the one which is away from 
the city center. 
(2) Some methodological issues 
The m jor methodological problem in cognitive 
mapping research is concerned with how to external-
ize the i･ndividual's internal (cognitive) map of the 
e vironment. Basically, two types of methodology 
h ve been employed. The first type uses sketch 
maps drawn by subjects to represent their cognitive 
maps. This method was first used systematically by 
Lynch (1960) in his classic study on environmental 
cognition. Lynch simply asked residents of three US 
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cities (Boston, Jersy City, and Los Angels) to draw 
rough sketch maps of their cities. Analyses of these 
maps and interview data revealed that cognitive 
maps of urban settings included the following five 
key features: paths, edges, districts, nodes, Iand-
marks. This taxononry of urban elements of cognitive 
maps has been applied to many other cities (e.g., 
Appleyard, 1969) . 
There are several serious problems with this 
method. First, as Golledge (1976) indicates, indi-
vidual differences in drawin~ ability may confound 
sketch map outpht. In other words, sketch map data 
might underrepresent a person's 'knowledge about 
the environment due to his poor drawing ability. 
This is particularly likely when young children are 
involved in the study. Few data are available on the 
effects of graphic ability on sketch maps of the 
actual environment. Second, it was indicated (Beck 
& Wood, 1976) that the individual's experience of 
reading a cartographic map of an environment en-
hanced the accuracy and complexity of a hand-
drawn sketch map of that environment. However, 
many reported studies using this sketch map metho-
dology did not consider map experience as an impor-
tant factor. Finally, it is suggested that the scale of 
the sketch map may be important in how various 
elements are represented (see Evans, 1980) . 
The second type of methodology uses small 
models and photographs to simulate the individual's 
experience of large-scale, real environments. Since 
small-scale models and photographs preclude motor-
ic experience, they cannot examine the role of actual 
locomotion in the real environment in cognitive map-
ping. For example, in Laurendean and Pinard's ex-
periment (1970, ･cited in Moore, 1976) the child 
was required to position several toy persons at cer-
tain places on a model landscape consisting of a 
road, railroad tracks, fire houses of different sizes 
and colors. The question is whether this experiment 
can tell anything about the child's ability to do the 
same thing in a real (corresponding) environment. 
It is already demonstrated that the size of the model 
affects how various elements are recognized and 
used (e. g., Acredolo, 1977) . 
However, there are several studies indicating 
the validity of using small-scale models. For exam-
ple, Kozlowski and Bryant (1977) presented a frag-
mentary map of a campus to university students and 
asked them to indic te various buildings on that 
map It was shown that the ability to locate the 
buildings ac urately was correlated with the self-
assessment of the individual's sense of direction. 
Furthermore, ince the self-assessment was also 
shown to be correlated with one's performance in a 
maze orientation task (i.e., real environment) , it is 
possible that the small scale mapping task can re-
veal c rtain aspect of one's spatial ability in the 
large-scale environment. 
(3) Some representative studies 
As stat d earlier, one of the major functions of 
the cog itive map is o provide locational informa-
ti n which consists of the distance and direction of a 
given object or place with respect to a certain refer-
ence point (in ma y cases, this is where the idivi-
dual is located) . Several studies have been published 
on how human beings estimate distance and direc-
tion in larg -scale environments. In Baird. Merrill, 
and Tan enbau 's study (1979) , graduate students 
were asked to represent (recall) the relative lota-
tions of buildings in a familiar campus setting by 
pairwise distance judgements on a 100-point scale 
and by direct mapping of locations on a cathode ray 
scope erminal. Th use of the scope terminal was 
presumed to minimize the effect of individual differ-
ences in graphic ability. The pairwise judgements 
were analyzed by multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
and the bu l ngs were located on a two-dimensional 
map. Comparisons between the map directly pre-
sented on the sc pe and the map derived from MbS 
indicat that although both agreed closely with each 
other and with th actual spatial relations, the for-
m r is closer to the actual map of the campus set-
ting. Interestingly, the subjects felt that their direct 
map was more accurate than the actual map. These 
results suggest that the cognitive representation of a 
familiar environment as revealed by direct mapping 
and pairw e comparisons is faithful to the actual 
spatial relations within that environment. 
In a related study, Sadalla, Burroughs, and Sta-
plin (1980) asked students to rate 20 Iocations on a 
university campus and in a larger metropolitan area 
on three 9-point scales selected to measure the sali-
ence and import nce of each location. Their hypoth-
esis was that the estimation of the distance between 
two locations v ries depending on the saliency of or 
subject's familiarity with these lodations. More spe-
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cifically, they hypothesized that a highly salient 
location, when paired with a nonsalient location, 
would serve as a reference point for the nonsalient 
location. The students were asked to make pairwise 
comparisons of the locations by locating two points 
on a sheet of paper (one point was always located 
at the origin of a semicircular grid) . The results in-
dicated that when one member of a location pair was 
more salient than the other, the distance between the 
former (reference location) and the latter 
(nonreference location) was estimated as signifi-
cantly less than the distance between the nonrefer-
ence location and the reference location. A similar 
observation was described earlier (Lee, 1970) . This 
asymmetry of distance estimation suggests that the 
strict Euclidean rule cannot be applied to the cogni-
tive map. Furthermore, they indicated that when the 
subjects were cognitively located in reference loca-
tions, their distance and direction estimation of 
other locations was quicker (i.e., short reaction time) 
than otherwise. These results suggest that so-called 
reference points exist in spatial cognition and that 
these points provide an organizational structure that 
facilitates the estimation Qf adjacent locations in 
space. 
The reference points may be related to the no-
tion of landmark, which refers to the diseriminative 
features of an environment that guide navigational 
decisions in that environment. The role of landmarks 
in cognitive mapping was examined by Allen, Siegel, 
and Rosinski (1978) . They hypothesized that the 
traveler stores two types of spatial information dur-
ing exploration of the environment: (1) specific en-
vironmental features which form the basis of land-
mark knowledge, and (2) the temporal-spatial rela-
tions among these features which form the basis of 
route knowledge. The route may be defined here as a 
sensori-motor routine that links one landmark to 
another conceptually. In this study, students were 
presented with color slides taken at various inter-
vals along walks through urban areas to simulate 
the perceptual arrays comprising spatial events. The 
results indicated that subjects' estimates of distance 
between various points along a pictured walk were 
related to actual distances and were more accurate 
when the subjects (1) estimated distances among 
scenes with high land-mark potential rather than 
low landmark potential, and (2) viewed the walk 
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twice rather than once. Similar results were 
obtained when the subjects viewed a randomized 
ra her than l gically sequenced slide presentation 
(note that the slides contained some overlapping 
elements) . This suggests that perceptual continuity 
is not necessary for the individual to acquire spatial 
knowledge about specific routes, provided he has 
sufficient perceptual cues from the route's context. 
Although the above study demonstrated the un-
necessity of locomotion (exploration) in an actual 
nv ronment to form judgements about relative dis-
tances be w e  sc n s (1andmarks) , it seems likely 
that exploration of the environment increases the 
accuracy of such judgements. In fact, a number of 
studies ( .g., Golledg . Rivizzigno, & Spector, 1976) 
indicat  that the accuracy of subjects' estimates of 
interlocation distances increases as their expierience 
with environments a cumulates. 
In summary, the studies described in this sec-
tion simply suggest that human subjects have cogni-
tive representations of large-scale environments and 
these represe t tions enable them to accurately esti-
m e distances and directions among places ivithin 
these vir nments. Furthermore, these representa-
tions are presumed to be essenial for correct naviga-
tion in real environments. _These representations 
may be enriched, revised, and updated through repe-
ated exp rience w th the (changing) envirorilnent~. 
The studies described above should be taken only as 
a  initia  step toward a fuller understanding of the 
structure and opera ion of cognitive maps. A number 
of questions remain to be examined. For example, it 
is not clear how humans acquire spatial knowledge 
about their enviro ments. Particularly, since all 
aspects of n environment cannot be observed simul-
taneously, the observer needs to integrate different 
scenes into a coherent whole. Although it is appa-
re t that memory is involved in this integration, no 
detailed theory exists as to how this integration is 
carried out. 
Recent developmental studies provide 'some 
clues to this a d other important problems of spatial 
cognition. In contr st with sophisticated spatial pro-
cess ng in adu ts, spatial processing in children 
takes relatively simpler forms and thus can be 
nalyzed mor  conveniently. Furthermore, since 
most studies on spatial perception in general have 
been don  in a developmental context, it seems im-
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portant to examine spatial processing from the de-
velopmental point of view. 
m. The development of cognitive mapping 
T.here are two major models of the development 
of spatial representations of large-scale environ-
ments, one proposed by Siegel and White (1975) 
and the other by Hart and Moore (1973) and Hart 
and Berzok (1982) . Both models are heavily influ-
enced by the Piajetian perspective on spatial cogni-
tion. Hart and Moore's developmental model may be 
summarized as follows. Initially, young children rely 
heavily on egocentric cues to orient and locate ob-
jects in space (stage I -egocentric frame of 
reference) . This stage is followed by the use of fixed 
objects in space, first singly and eventually coordi-
nating multiple objects' interrelationships to the 
observer (stage II -fixed frame of refer~nce) . 
Finally, comprehension of space as a coordinated 
system, independent of the object's or person's posi-
tion, is established (stage nu-coordinated frame of 
reference) . 
Several experimental studies support this mod-
el. In an early study of per~pective taking, Piajet 
and his associates (Piajet & Inh~lder, 1967) asked 
children to tell what a doll's view of three, distinc-
tively modelled mountains would be when it was 
placed at various viewpoints. Younger children (4-
6 .5 years) selected from pictures showing various 
viewpoints the picture corresponding to their own 
view rather than the doll's view. These younger chil-
dren persisted in this type of egocentric representa-
tion of space, even when allowed to walk around the 
mountain model and view from the doll's perspec-
tive. With the appearence of so-called concrete op-
erations (7-9 years) , there is a progressive dif-
ferentiation of viewpoints. Before and behind are 
correctly differentiated first, then left and right. 
Finally, children could be able to perform the task 
correctly, suggesting that they could master an 
objective perspective that is independent of their 
egocentric viewpoint. 
In another study by Piajet and Inhelder (1967) , 
children were asked to place objects on a model 
landscape. The child was presented with a model on 
which a doll was placed. Then the child was asked 
to place the doll at the identical location on a second 
(identical) model which was rotated 180". To place 
the doll co rec ly, the child could not use his own 
position as a reference point but had to use ejther 
parts of the model itself (fixed reference) or some 
syste atic relationships among pbjects on the model. 
Very young children (3-4 years) placed the doll on 
the basi  of its proximity to certain salient objects 
on the model. No recognition of distance, before-af-
ter, and left-right was apparent. During the next 
stage (4-6 years) , egocentricism appeared in that 
children located the doll relative to their own posi-
tion and disregarded rotation. At the end of this 
stage, howeve , children gradually comprehended 
left-right, and before-after. relationships, order, and 
distance through trial-and-error learnihg (stage II ) . 
At stage ~l (6-7 years) , model rotation no longer 
confus d the child's judgement and the doll was 
placed c rrectly. In summary, these studies indicate 
that developmentally children first rely on 
egocentric cues, hen on one or a few referents 
(objects) , and finally on a system of coordinated 
referents. 
It should be noted that since Piajet's experi-
ments used small models theories supported by these 
experiments may not be applicable to larger-scale 
environments. Hdwev r, a recent study by Acredolo 
(1976) suggest  the applicability of Hart and 
M ore's model to these environments. In one of her 
experim nts, 3-, 4-, and 10-year-old chidren were led 
to a table o  their right as they entered an other-
wise empty room (a door and a window act as sta-
tionary cues) , and then blindfolded. Children were 
then led around the room, with half of them ending 
their walk at the opposite side of the room from the 
original entry (door) and half returning to the ori-
ginal entry point. Furthermore, for half of them, the 
table was moved to the opposite side (to the left of 
the door) of the room. The blindfold was removed, 
and the child was asked to return to the spot at 
which he or she had been blindfolded. Three-year-
olds either responded egdcentrically, turning to their 
right r gardless of change in bodily position or table 
positon, or depended on a fixed frame of reference 
provid d by the table. The 4-year-olds used table 
position predominant y to orient, whereas the 10-
year-olds relied on a coordinated frame of reference 
(consist ng of the stationary room cues) , correctly 
locating the original blindfolding point irrespective 
f their relative body position or the location of the 
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table. 
Siegel and White's (1975, see also Siegel, Kira-
sic, & Kail, 1978) developmetal model of environ-
mental cognition emphasizes spatial representation~ 
of large-scale environments as a basis for naviga-
tional actions. Their model may be summarized as 
follows. First, Iandmarks must be noticed and re-
membered. The child acts in the context of these 
landmarks (landmark knowledge). Once landmarks 
are established, route learning occurs within their 
context in a point-to-point fashion (route 
knowledge). Landmarks and routes are formed into 
clusters, but until an objective frame of reference is 
developed, these clusters remain uncoordinated with 
each other. Survey representations appear as a sys-
tem of routes arising from and embedded in an 
objective frame of reference (configurational 
knowled_ge) . 
The importance of landmarks in younger chil-
dren was noted by Acredolo, Pick, and Olsen 
(1975) . In their study, 3-, 4-, and 8-year-old children 
were led on a walk through a hallway in their 
school. During the walk, the experimenter 
"accidentally" dropped her keys in a hallway that 
had either a few distinctive landmarks (different 
chairs) or no furniture. The child was asked to re-
turn to the location of the key drop after walking 
through the hall. Younger children (3- and 4-year 
olds) made more errors than older children when no 
landmarks were present, but when landmarks were 
present, no age differences were found. The child's 
dependence on landmarks during orientation in 
space was also noted by Acredolo's experiment 
(1976) described earlier. 
Although landmarks are essential to wayfinding 
in the large environment, they are insufficient for 
constructing a cognitive map unless they are embed-
ded in a context of effective action, i.e., a method for 
moving from landmark to landmark. A primary func-
tion of a landmark is to help maintain one's passage 
on a particular route, which is a pathway connecting 
two landmarks. The environment can be conceptual-
ized as consisting of landmarks connected by routes. 
Shemyakin (1962, cited in Siegel & White, 1975) 
analy.zed children's sketch maps of their environ-
ments and found the orderly development from route 
representations to more wholistic survey representa-
tions. Six- to 7-year-old children usually drew only 
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those routes over which they actually and frequently 
travelled but ignored other routes they did not use. 
Older children produced maps depicting objective 
routes and their interconnections more systematical-
ly. 
Finally, Siegel and White (1975) suggested an 
inter sting possibility that adult learning of new en-
vironme al layouts migh mimic the developmental 
stages described above. That is, during an initial en-
counter with a new environment, an individual 
notices and learns about salient landmarks and uses 
them aS navigational aids. Then he acquires routes 
based on landmark knowledge and finally estab-
l shes a coordinated frame of reference (cognitive 
map) b sed on both landmark and route_ knowledge. 
N . Other related studies 
(1) Animal studies 
Congnitive mapping abilities are not limited to 
m . Many animals appear to possess cognitive maps 
superior to man's .cognitive maps. For example, 
many speci s of birds migrate hundreds and even 
thousands of kilometers every year to reach their 
bree ing grounds. These birds must have some 
means to locate themselves and goals in space in 
order to successfully reach the goals. A number of 
studies have been done to examine the basis of this 
extraord nary spatial ability of birds (e.g., Keeton, 
1979). The in focus of these studies has been to 
determi e what stimuli are used by animals and how 
these stimuli are processed to navigate optimally. 
Animal  could find heir way to a goal in sever-
al different ways (Griffin, 1955) : (1) piloting, 
which is steering by familiar landmarks, (2) com-
pass steering, which is heading in a constant com-
pass direction, and (3) true navigation, which is 
heading towards a specific goal regardless of the ori-
ginal starting place and the direction neccessary to 
achieve the goal. The first method is not directly re-
lated o cognitive mapping, since in piloting move-
ment is controlled by direct perception of environ-
mental features. Three kinds of cues have been iden-
tified t a  birds use for both compass steering and 
true navigatio : the sun, the stars, and magnetic 
f i lds. 
Birds use the u  to calculate compass direction 
by measuring its azimuth and calculating whether 
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the sun is located at that time of the day according 
to their internal biological clock. The best evidendce 
for this time compensation mechanism comes from 
studies in which the animal's diurnal clock has been 
artificially shifted by altering its day-night cycle. In 
such studies the birds do not fly in the homeward 
direction when released at a distant site, but head 
off in a direction consistent with the notion that they 
are calculating the. compass direction of the sun on 
the basis of their altered internal clock. 
The evidence that pigeons use geomagnetic cues 
comes from studies indicating that they could navi-
gate correctly under overcast skies and that their 
flight was severely disrupted if magnets are fixed to 
thier heads. A variety of nocturnal migrants such as 
buntings are known to use star patterns to deter-
mine directions. The time compensation is not re-
quired for this process mainly because birds largely 
rely on the immobile polar star. Several other cues 
have been found to help birds' navigation: gravita-
tional cues, olfactory cues, infrasonic cues, and 
meteorological cues (see Keeton, 1979) 
As Keeton (1979) indicated, the major remaining 
problem in this ares is concerned with how the bird 
integrates these various cues during actual naviga-
tion and how such a integrative process develops 
ontogenetically. In any case, the scope of cognitive 
mapping research will be greatly extended by con-
sidering birds' navigational skills within a larger 
framework of spatial cognition. 
In recent years, another line of cognitive map-
ping research has been carried out in the area of 
animal psychology. In a series of experiments, Olton 
and his associates (e.g., Olton, 1979) have examined 
the ability of rats to collect food efficiently from 
several locations. In their experiments, rats were 
placed on a radial maze with 8 or more radiating 
arms containing food pellets at their ends. Since 
each arm was baited only once in a trial, the optimal 
strategy for the rat was to choose each arm only 
once. The experiments indicated that rats learned 
this multiple place task without difficulty and t.hat 
their performance was not dependent on such 
strategies as egocentric orientation and the use of 
some proximate cues (e.g., odor). Rather, it was sug-
gested, that they could use extramaze spatial cues 
(landmarks) to guide their behavior (e.g. Suzuki, 
Augerinos, & Black, 1980) . Many recent maze stu-
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dies of this kind emphasize the efficacy of spatial 
strategies (presumably based on cognitive mapping) 
as opposed to strict S-R strategies in solving com-
plex spatial problems. 
O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) proposed in a 
neuropsychological context that during exploration 
of an env ronmen the animal forms a cognitive map 
of that environment, which incorporates spatial re-
latinships among various landmarks and places in-
cluding the animal's own position. The efficiency of 
th ani al's ability to solve apatial problems is con-
sidered to be based on its cognitive map of the en-
vironment. Interestingly, O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) 
regard the cognitive mapping strategy as qualitative-
ly different from such strategies as egocentric 
orienta io  and simple landmark utilization. 
(2) Neur psychological studies 
Neuropsychological studies of spatial cognition 
have be n concerned with the identification of neu-
ral systems responsible for processing and storing 
spati l information. The importance of the right 
posterior hemisphere for spatial processing has been 
demonstrated repeatedly in the literature of neurop-
sychology (e.g., Benton, 1982 ; Ratcliff, 1982) . 
Critchley (1953) documented extensively that the 
damage of the parieto-occipital region of the right 
hemi ph re produced various disturbances in 
visuospa ial functioning including loss of map-read-
ing abil y, visu l agnosia (inability to recognize 
objects) , Ioss of the ability to recognize faces, and 
construction apraxia (e.g., Ioss of drawing or con-
struction ability) . 
Recent studie  on sex differences in spatial abil-
ity (e.g., Harris, 1976 ; McGee, 1982 ; Newcombe, 
1982) suggest that males show superior spatial abi-
lities to female probably because of their greater 
right hemisphere specialization than females. This 
conclusion was based on the results of various spa-
tial asks including visual mazes, tactual mazes, map 
reading, Ieft-right discrimination, geographic 
orien ation, and Piaj tian tasks. It should be noted, 
however, that since most of these tasks involve the 
use of small m del , they may not be appropriate for 
testing true cognitive mapping abilities. In fact, most 
tests done in larger en･vironments have found no sex 
difference  in environmental knowledge (e.g., Maur-
r & Bazt r, 1972) or in locating objects in real 
space with a sighting tube (Hardwick, Mclntyre, & 
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Pick, 1976) . 
Related to this is the question of whether the 
right parietal region is the only site of the cognitive 
map. According to O'Keefe and Nadel (1978), the 
parietal area is involved in purely egocentric spatial 
processing, while the hippocampus serves as a congi-
tive map .which processes non-egocentric spatial in-
formation. They presented numerous experiments 
supporting their position. More recently, however, 
O'Keefe and Nadel's proposal is challenged by Olton 
and his associates (see Olton, 1982) , who stress 
that the hippocampus is involved in working mem-
ory rather than in cognitive mapping. 
It should be noted, here, that most neuro-
psychological studies (with an exception of O'Keefe 
& Nadel, 1978) have been done without theoretical 
considerations on the basic processes involved in va-
rious spatial tasks. Consequently, it is not clear 
what kinds of spatial abilities are involved in each 
spatjal task and how .they are affected by specific 
neural systems. Such theoretical models as de-
veloped in the area of cognitive development should 
be considered in the analysis of neuropsychological 
correlates of spatial cognition. 
V . Conclusions 
It is necessary for all animals to perceive their 
environments accurately and behave accordingly in 
order to survive. It is not surprising to see that most 
animals and man possess a considerable amount of 
knowledge about their environments. Particularly, as 
Kaplan (1973) suggested, man's excellent ability to 
acquire and use spatial knowledge about his en-
vironment seems to have originated from his evolu-
tionary history in which such ability has played a 
crucial role for survival. The importance of such 
ability is still recognizable in this civilized world. 
Recent studies on environmental perception in 
adults have mainly focused on describing and clas-
sifying certain environmental features important for 
organizing, environmental experience and action. 
Several psychometric studies on distance and dir~c-
tion estimation about various locations within large-
scale settings have revealed that human beings have 
relatively accurate representations of their familiar 
environments. However, it has been noted that cogni-
tive maps containing these representations are in 
many ways different from cartographic maps of cor-
~f~~5tc ~~71~~ 
responding environments. Distortions of distances, 
directions, and a tributes of locations are commonly 
ob erved. Yet there is no systematic knowledge ab-
out causes and meanings of such distortions. 
Most of he availab e methodologies of studying 
cognitiV  m pping processes have serious flaws. For 
xample, it has not yet been established how reliably 
hand-drawn sketch maps could represent internal 
cognitive maps. And the applicability of findings 
obtained with small m dels to larger, real-life situa-
tions is not clarified. Several recent methodological 
innovations including the use of psychometric tech-
niques (e.g., MDS) and quantifiable orientation 
tasks (e.g., Hardwick, et al., 1976) may increase 
methodological rigor which has been lacking in this 
f ield. 
Developmental research on environmental 
perception has som  success in revealing certain 
aspects of the t rnal structure of cognitive maps. 
Hart and Moore (1973) suggest that young children 
first use egocentric cues to orient in space, follwed 
by reliance on relative position to one then to multi-
ple fixed points in space and finally, comprehension 
of space as a coordinated system. Siegel and White 
(1975) suggest that children first acquire land-
mark knowledge, then route knowledge, and finally 
configurational knowledge (cognitive map) . These 
two conceptual zations of the development of spatial 
cognition have many points in common. For example, 
landma k knowledge provides a fixed frame of refer-
ce, while configurational knowledge is essential to 
establish a coordina ed frame of reference. The only 
conceptu l difference is whether spatial representa-
tions are regard d as constituting a frame of refer-
ence or a form of knowledge. 
Studies of animal navigation and spatial learn-
ing are consistent with human research. All forms of 
spatial abilities including egocentric orientation, 
landmark utilization, and cognitive mapping have 
b en d monstra ed in animals. According to O'Keefe 
and Nadel (1978) , many animals have all these abi-
litie  d which one is used in a particular situation 
depends on the nature of an imposed task. When 
asks demand the use of non-egocentric spatial solu-
t , animals use cognitive mapping efficiently. 
There has been a controversy as to the neurolo-
gical site of cognitive mapping funcion. Traditional-
ly, it s localized in the parietal lobe, while recently 
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the hippocampus is implicated. According to O'Keefe 
and Nadel (1978) it is essential to distinguish 
egocentric and nonegocentric spatial functions in 
terms of their underlying neural systems. Siegel and 
White (1975) also suggested that there are para-
llels between develo~mental stages and neurological 
hierarchies in spatial cognition. This view may be 
substantiated if hierarchical neural systems subserv-
ing hierarchical spatial functions show differetial de-
velopment so that there is a match between the de-
velopment of a neural system and the emergence of a 
corresponding spatial function. This view has been 
partially supported in studies on both the hippocam-
pus and the parietal cortex. 
In conclusion, the study of cognitive mapping 
seems to be able to provide a rare opportunity to 
establish a truly multidisciplinary enterprise where 
the relatively small number of concepts and hypoth-
eses could be applied to a large number of empirical 
domains. If this is the case, then we have common 
grounds for studying cognitive mapping in percep-
tual psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental 
psychology, neuropsychology, animal psychology, en-
vironmental psychology, behavioral geography, 
urban planning, architecture, etc. 
References 
Acredolo, L. P. 1976 Frames of reference used by 
children for orientation in unfamiliar spaces. In G. 
T. Moore, & R. G. Golledge . (Eds.) , Enviornmen-
tal knowing. Pennsylvania: Dowden, Hutchinson & 
Ross. 
Acredolo. L. P. 1977 Developmental changes in the 
ability to coordinate perspectives of a large-scale 
environment. Developmental Psychology, 13, 1-8. 
Acredolo, L. P.. Pick, H. L., & Olsen, M. 1975 En-
vironmental differentiaton and familiarity as de-
terminants of children's memory for spatial loca-
tidn. Developmental Psychology, 11 , 495-501. 
Allen, G., Siegel, A., & Rosinski, R. 1978 The role of 
perceptual context in structuring spatial know-
ledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 4, 617-630. 
Appleyard, D. A. 1969 Why buildings are known. 
Enviornment and Behavior, I , 131-156. 
Baird, J. C. (Ed.) 1970 Human space perception: 
Proceedings of the Darthmouth conference. 
Psy honomic Journals Inc. 
Baird. J. C., Merrill, A. A., & Tannenbaum, J. 1979 
Studies o  the congn tive representation of spatial 
relations: II . A familiar environment. Journal of 
Experim ntal Psychology: General, 108, 92-98. 
Beck, R. J., & W od, D. 1976 Cognitive transforma-
tion of information from urban geographic fields 
to mental maps. En ironment and Behavior, 8, 
199-238. 
Benton, A. 1982 Spatial thinking in neurological pa-
tients: Historical aspects. In M. Potegal (Ed. ) , 
Spatial abilities: Development and physiological 
foundations. New York: Academic Press, Pp. 
253-275, 
Critchley, M. 1953 The parietal lobes. London: 
A nold. 
Downs, R. M., & St a, D. 1973 Image and environ-
ment: Cogi tive mapping and spatial behavior. 
Chicago: Aldine. 
Evans, G. W. 1980 Environmental cogniton. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 88, 259-287. 
Gold, J. R. 1980 An introduction to behavioral 
geogra h . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Golledge, R. G. 1976 Methods and methodological 
issues in environmental cognition research. In G. 
T. Moore, & R. G. Golledge (Eds.) , Environmental 
knowing. Pennsylvania: Dowden. Hutchinson & 
Ross. 
G lledge, R.G.. Rivizzlgno, V. L., & Spector, A. 1976 
Learning about a city: Analysis by multi-
dimensional scaling. In R. G. Golledge, & G. Rush-
ton (Eds.) . Spatial choice and spatial behavior. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Griffin, D. R. 1955 Bird navigation. In. A. Wolfson 
(Ed.) , Recent studies in avian biology. 11linois: 
University of lllinois Press. Pp. 154-197. 
Hardwick, D. A., Mclntyre, C. W., 8z Pick, H. L. 1976 
The content and manipulation of cognitive maps in 
child en and adults. Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 41 (3), Serial No. 
166. 
Harr s, L. J. 1976 Sex differences in spatial ability: 
Possible environmental, genetic, and neurological 
factors. In M. Kinsbourne (Ed.), Asymmetrical 
funct on of the brain Cambridge University Press. 
Hart, R., & Berzok, M. 1982 Children's strategies for 
apping the geographic-scale environment. In M. 
26 ~~~~f 
Potegal (Ed.), Spatial abilities: Developmental and 
physiological foundations. New York: Academic 
Press. Pp. 147-169. 
Hart, R. A., & Moore, G, T. 1973 The development of 
spatial cognition: A review. In R. M. Downs, & D. 
Stea (Eds.), Image and environment: Cognitive 
mapping and'spatial behavior. Chicago: Aldine. Pp. 
246-288. 
Ittelson, W. 1973 Environmental perception and con-
temporary perceptual theory. In W. Ittelson (Ed.) , 
Environment and cognition. New York: Seminary. 
Kaplan, S. 1973 Cognitive maps in perception and 
thought. In R. M. Downs, & D. Stea (Eds.) , Image 
and environment: Cognitive mapping and spatial 
behavior. Chicago: Aldine. Pp. 63-78. 
Keeton, W. T. 1979 Avian orientation and naviga-
tion. Annual Review of Physiology,41, 353-366. 
Kozlowski, L. T., & Bryant, K. J. 1977 Sense of direc-
tion, spatial orientation and cognitive maps. Jour-
nal of ~xperimental Psychology: Human Percep-
tion and Performance, 3, 590-598. 
Laurendeau. M., & Pinard, A. 1970 The development 
of the concept of space in the child. New York: In-
ternational Universities Press. 
Lee, T. R. 1970 Perceived distance as a function of 
direction in the city. Enviroment and Behavior, 2, 
40-50. 
Lynch, K. 1960 The image of the city. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Maurer, R., & Baxter. J. C. 1972 Images of the neigh-
borhood and city among black, anglo, and Mex-
ican-American children. Environment and Be-
havior, 4, 351-388. 
McGee, M. G. 1982 Spatial abilities: The influence of 
genetic factors. In M. Potegal (Ed. ) , Spatial abili-
ties: Development and physiological foundations. 
New York: Academic Press. Pp. 199-~22. 
Moore, G, T. 1976 Theory and research on the de-
velopment of environmental knowing. In G. T. 
Moore, & R. G. Golledge (Eds.), Environmental 
knowing. Pennsylvania: Dowden, Hutchins~)n & 
Ross. 
Newcombe, N. 1982 Sex-related differences in spa-
tial ability: Problems and gaps in current 
approaches. In M. Potegal (Ed. ) , Spatial abilities: 
Development and physiological foundations. New 
York: Academic Press, Pp . 223-250. 
O'Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. 1978 The hippocampus as a 
cognitive map. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Olton, D. S. 1979 Mazes, maps and memory. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 34, 583-596. 
Olton, D. S. 1982 Spatially organized behaviors of 
a imals: Behavioral and neurological studies. In 
M. Potegal (Ed.) , Spatial abilities: Development 
and physiological foundations. New York: 
Aacademic Press. Pp. 335-360. 
Piaj t, J., & Inhelder, B. 1967 The child's conception 
of space. New York: Norton. 
Proshansky, H. M., Ittelson, W. H., & Rivlin, L. G. 
(Eds. ) 1976 Environmental psychology. 2nd ed. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Ratcl ff, G. 1982 Disturbances of spatial orientation 
associated with cerebral lesions. In M. Potegal (Ed.) , 
Spatial abilities: Development and physiological 
f undations. New York: Academic Press, Pp. 
30 -331. 
Sadalla, E. K., Burroughs, W. J., & Staplin, L. J. 1980 
Reference points in spatial cognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 6, 516-528. 
Shemyakin, F. N. 1962 General problems of orienta-
tion in space and space representations. In B. G. 
A anyev (Ed.) , Psychological Science in the 
USSR. Vol. 1. Arlington: US Office of Technical 
Reports. 
Siegel, A W., & White, S. H. 1975 The development 
of spatial representations of large-scale environ-
ments. In H. W. Reese (Ed.) , Advances in Child 
Development and Behavior. Vol. 10. New York: 
Academic Press.
Siegel, A. W., Kirasic, K. C., & Kail, R. V. Jr. 1978 
Stalking the elusive cognitive map: The develop-
ment of children's representations of geographic 
space. In I. Al ma , & J. F. Wohlwill (Eds.) , Chil-
dren and the environment. New York: Plenum 
P s. 
Suzuki, S., Augerinos, G., & Black, A. H. 1980 Stimu-
lus control of spatial behavior on the eight-arm 
maze in rats. Learning and Motivation, 11, 1-18. 
Tolman, E. C. 1948 Cognitive maps in rats and men. 
Psychologi al Review, 55, 189-208. 
1984. 9. 30 ;~;~~~ 
